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It’s (Still) All In Our Heads: Non-Ideal Theory as Grounded Reflective Equilibrium 




Abstract: Jaggar names six features of naturalized “reasoning toward justification.”  
These reasoning practices are desirable because they are likely to help non-ideal philosophers 
describe problems more completely, construct more accurate and compelling thick moral 
accounts, achieve better understandings of what is at stake for whom, and gain new insights 
about not only the problem under investigation but about moral concepts and conundrums more 
broadly.  Contrary to Jaggar’s epistemological claims, however, these justificatory reasoning 
practices are neither fully “naturalized” nor hence epistemologically novel.  Furthermore, the 
methodological process of reason-seeking and reason-giving that Jaggar proposes need not—
perhaps should not—lead to the construction of realistic utopias.  Non-ideal theory would do 
better to use naturalized epistemologies to identify and explore novel moral concepts and 
conceptions, to propose non-utopian approaches to mitigate lived injustice, and even to construct 
fully idealized normative theories about moral phenomena and questions made visible by 
situated inquiry into non-ideal circumstances. 
 
Alison Jaggar offers an amazingly ambitious project for reforming the methods, content, 
and conclusions of philosophical inquiry.  As I understand the project, which she is undertaking 
in collaboration with Theresa W. Tobin, she proposes four significant moves.1  (I should note 
that this is my analytic construction, not hers.) First, she wants to redirect epistemology of moral 
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justification from idealized and universal epistemological frames to ones that are non-ideal, 
naturalized, and contextually situated.  Second, based on her commitment to naturalized and 
situated moral epistemology, she proposes a methodological innovation: namely, to do case 
studies of “actual reasoning toward justification” in order to identify “models of justificatory 
reasoning that actually work.”  These case studies are intended in turn to reveal generalizable, 
but not universalizable, methods for moral reasoning that can be applied in appropriately 
specific, situated, non-ideal contexts.   
Third, Jaggar wants to redirect both the epistemological methods and normative 
substance of philosophical inquiry to focus on diversity and inequality in power relations.  
Methodologically, every justificatory reasoning process should be subjected to power analyses, 
to ensure that inequalities are not replicated or even reified—no matter how subtly—in the 
reason-giving and reason-accepting process.  Substantively, philosophers should be reasoning in 
collaboration with others about real-life cases of power inequities in diverse contexts.  This will 
ensure that power, inequality, and diversity are made central to philosophical methodology and 
normative substance.  Finally, fourth, these methods and objects of inquiry are intended to lead 
to the construction of “realistic utopias”: “models of ideal societies that are relevant to existing 
problems, morally compelling, and credible possibilities for human beings to reach from where 
we are now.”  These realistic utopias, ultimately, are Jaggar’s “theory of change,” to borrow 
terminology from the worlds of policy analysis and organizations.  They will “provide reliable 
guidance as we work to build just institutions in real world situations.” 
This account of philosophy’s justificatory purposes, methods, and content stands in stark 
contrast to both ideal and non-ideal theory.  Jaggar explains clearly why she is skeptical about 
the usefulness of theory that is ideal all the way down: i.e., of theory that presumes fully 
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compliant participants in a fully just system that is constructed (often inside a single 
philosopher’s head) so as to include no recognized historical, social, cultural, or other injustices. 
As many other non-ideal theorists argue as well, there are good reasons to take into account more 
realistic understandings of human nature in all its frailty; to pay attention to pervasive 
inequalities and injustices that are baked into contemporary social and political institutions; and 
to bring in multiple perspectives about these experiences that may broaden the understandings of 
privileged, Western, often male, often white professional philosophers. 
But Jaggar goes further than many non-ideal theorists by then implicitly turning these 
critiques of ideal theory upon non-ideal theory itself.  Many non-ideal theorists look at the world 
as it is to identify problems of justice, ethics, or morality. But they then theorize about these 
problems from the philosopher’s armchair, perhaps informed by a foray into JStor for some 
empirical social science insights.  Non-ideal theory that proceeds this way starts with a real-
world, perhaps historically and socially contextualized problem, and then asks questions such as: 
“What would theorist X say about this problem?”  “What would Y principle demand?”  “Why is 
this situation wrong, in light of conceptions A and B, and what would ideally happen instead?”  I 
think that Jaggar would agree that such theorizing may serve as useful steps toward providing 
reliable guidance about building just institutions in real world situations.  But she also implies—
and I agree with her on this—that this approach risks retreating far too quickly into “ideal 
reasoning” or “idealizing methods…for justifying normative claims.”  By focusing on applying 
ideal theories to non-ideal cases, engaging in idealized and non-situated methods of reasoning, 
and/or drawing conclusions that themselves are entirely idealized, non-ideal theorists potentially 
undercut their capacities to be truly action guiding.  Jaggar suggests this line of critique in raising 
questions about her own earlier scholarship that sought to eliminate gender and class.  She also 
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critiques reasoning about how to get from a non-ideal “here” to an idealized “there” as utopian 
and unrealistic because it neither includes nor responds to the perspectives of those who are most 
enmeshed in the real-world situation. 
By contrast, I take it that Jaggar’s argument is that truly non-ideal, or naturalized, moral 
epistemologies leave both the armchair and the theory behind.  Non-ideal philosophers ask 
instead: What do the participants in this contested situation say? To whom do they say it, how, 
and why? What kinds of counterclaims, from whom, delivered in what way, do the participants 
seem to recognize as legitimate, and how do they indicate this? How did this problem come to 
be? What is its history? How does this history, and this social account of the problem, interact 
with other histories, sociologies, and cultural constructions? How do different participants 
characterize the problem and its history? How do they describe its nature, identify what values 
are involved, or map the landscape of potential moral solutions? Finally, given all of this, what 
kind of “plausible, usable, power sensitive, and…feasible”2 solution—what kind of realistic 
utopia—can be constructed toward which all members of the moral community might strive? 
I am a huge fan of these kinds of questions.  I think that such approaches broaden 
philosophers’ moral understanding in a number of ways.  Non-ideal theorists will describe 
problems more completely, construct more accurate and compelling thick moral accounts, 
achieve better understandings of what is at stake for whom, and gain new insights about not only 
the problem under investigation but about moral concepts and conundrums more broadly, if we 
systematically engage in such questioning.   
Nonetheless, I remain perplexed by Jaggar’s central epistemological and methodological 
claims about these inquiry practices.  First, I don’t fully understand how these kinds of questions 
lead to a truly novel philosophical epistemology.  I’m confused about what “reasoning toward 
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justification” means outside of a fairly standard philosophical account of reason-giving.  To the 
extent that Jaggar is proposing an exercise still in normative philosophy, rather than an out-and-
out shift to anthropology, cultural sociology, or the like, it seems to me that the ideas 
philosophers encounter in engaging with the “other” must ultimately enter philosophers’ own 
heads.  In other words, if historical and interpretive empirical research serves as a source of ideas 
about moral justification, but not as fixed claims immune to challenge, then how can (and 
should) moral epistemology ever be fully naturalized?  Second, I am perplexed by why the 
methodological process of reason-seeking and reason-giving that Jaggar proposes must or even 
should lead to the construction of realistic utopias.  Nor am I convinced that the construction of 
realistic utopias is actually a desirable or meaningful aim for non-ideal theory.  Instead, I suggest 
that non-ideal theory would do better to use naturalized epistemologies to identify and explore 
novel moral concepts and conceptions, to propose non-utopian approaches to mitigate lived 
injustice, and even to construct fully idealized normative theories about moral phenomena and 
questions made visible by situated inquiry into non-ideal circumstances.  These all seem like 
more useful contributions by non-ideal theory than the construction of realistic utopias. 
NATURALIZED REASONING TOWARD JUSTIFICATION 
In her Lecture, Jaggar names six features of naturalized “reasoning toward justification.”3  
Such reasoning should be: (1) intersubjective; (2) empirical, not hypothetical; (3) inclusive; (4) 
fitted to specific contexts, meaning both that naturalized reasoning may vary by context, and that 
within any one context, the reasons given should be “‘followable’ by everyone involved;” (5) 
constructed collaboratively with and informed by multiple disciplines, as well as by moral 
reasoners who are not academics; and (6) reflexive, to keep philosophers humble.   
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I’m sympathetic to the motivations underlying each of these features, as I am to the 
motivations underlying Jaggar’s and Tobin’s project as a whole.  But I also question how these 
qualities are identified with or achieved entirely within a “naturalized” framework. As Jaggar 
acknowledges, every (interesting) empirical example of reasoning features imbalances of power 
and privilege. Every possible example of moral reasoning also excludes some legitimate 
claimants and/or is biased in some practical way.  There are no uncompromised communities of 
reasoners.  This means that philosophers must make some non-naturalized judgments about what 
kinds of reasons are acceptable, from whom, and under what conditions. For example, what does 
an inclusive and intersubjective form of mutually intelligible moral reasoning look like in 
empirical practice? Do we reason with racists or misogynists?  Do we reason with people so 
oppressed by current states of affairs that any utopia seems unrealistic, even cruel to 
contemplate?  How about those so privileged by current states of affairs that they view radical 
change as a declaration of war against cherished ways of life?  It seems that any 
metaphilosophical account of methods needs an account of who is part of the intersubjective 
community—one that goes beyond what solely naturalistic accounts can provide. 
This is why even if naturalized or non-ideal theory rightly leads philosophers to seek 
reasons from a more diverse set of interlocutors engaging in more varied forms of moral 
justification than they usually pay attention to, this doesn’t represent an alternative moral 
epistemology.  The process of seeking knowledge is different.  But the criteria for what counts 
as knowledge, as reasonable moral justification, seem to remain the same. Consider Jaggar’s 
insistence that reasons should be “followable” by participants in the justification process.  This 
presumably cannot mean that reason-giving is justified only when the other side is convinced; 
that would be far too demanding.  If, on the other hand, justification is taken to be legitimate so 
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long as the reasons are merely understandable by others, then I fail to see how this project is 
truly empirical, inclusive, and “followable.” 
An alternative way of exploring this same question is by asking whether naturalized 
moral epistemological methods produce insights that can ultimately be mastered and conveyed 
by one philosopher, or whether knowledge will always be dispersed among multiple 
interlocutors.  If knowledge is always dispersed, then intersubjective moral reasoning certainly 
has a distinctive naturalized epistemology, but it also fails as a form of moral reasoning.  
Ultimately, reasons must become shared for the project of justification to succeed.  If, on the 
other hand, the relevant reasons are in the end accessible to a single philosopher, then her 
process of coming-to-know may be naturalized, but her knowing is not epistemologically 
distinctive.  Naturalized reasoning provides an effective and efficient way for philosophers to 
achieve insights that they are unlikely to achieve while nestled in their armchairs.  But the final 
epistemological grounding of reasons accessed in the field and reasons accessed from one’s 
armchair is the same. 
Given this, I question whether these six features are even particular to naturalized 
approaches to moral justification.  For example, it presumably is not the case that only those 
working collaboratively to develop new models of justification must be reflective, or even that 
these philosophers should be more reflexive than others.  Presumably, all non-ideal theorists, and 
even ideal theorists who want to get things right by checking their own intuitions against others’ 
judgments, should also engage in reflexive theorizing.  Similarly, it seems that all moral theories 
will be strengthened by inclusive attempts to understand and, if appropriate, integrate novel 
perspectives, as well as to attend to forms of justification that aren’t immediately familiar but can 
be understood over time.   
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Arguably, this is a strength of Jaggar’s arguments in favor of getting philosophers out of 
their armchairs, into the field, and into reflexive, thickly moral, interdisciplinarily-informed 
conversations, ceremonies, or storytelling and testimony-giving sessions with diverse others.  
Jaggar’s methods needn’t be limited to a small class of intrepid, “muddy boots” philosophers.  
Rather, many philosophers could benefit from such engagement, ideal and non-ideal alike.  
Perhaps this is because such engagement could be understood as an exercise in what I suggest we 
call “grounded reflective equilibrium” (an analogue, perhaps, to grounded theory in social 
sciences).4  To the extent that this is an accurate characterization of naturalist philosophical 
methods, it reinforces my judgment that they are epistemologically continuous with other 
normative philosophical approaches—even if grounded reflective equilibrium is far more open to 
intersubjective and empirical ways of knowing than Rawls ever dreamed.   
WHY REALISTIC UTOPIAS? 
Although I question some of the epistemological claims that Jaggar makes about 
naturalized reasoning toward justification, I ultimately embrace most of the practices that she 
advances.  This is not true for her claim that philosophy should aim to produce “realistic 
utopias.”   
First, I am simply confused by the relationship between naturalistic moral epistemology 
and the construction of realistic utopias.  Is naturalistic moral epistemology particularly well-
suited to designing realistic utopias?  Is it necessary for designing them?  Is it confined to 
designing them?  I don’t see why the answer to any of these questions is “yes.”  For example, I 
could imagine theorists using Jaggar’s methods investigating specific problems and drawing 
conclusions that are utterly non-utopian: how to strike the right balance between needs of 
disabled and non-disabled children in allocating educational funding in Florida, say, or whether 
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teachers in Seattle should accommodate parents’ or students’ demands to boycott high stakes 
standardized tests, and on what grounds.  These kinds of questions are important, appropriately 
informed by naturalized inquiry, and deeply bound up with issues of diversity and inequality.  
But they have little to do with utopia construction, realistic or otherwise.5   
Second, I don’t know how one decides what is “realistic” or “utopian.”  Philosophers 
always stipulate a bunch of assumptions, and then try to prove an argument that is consonant 
with, but extends beyond, what has been stipulated.  But what are Jaggar’s criteria for what is to 
be stipulated and what is to be taken as open for contestation or change?  In my recent book No 
Citizen Left Behind, I stipulated the persistence of de facto segregated schools serving low-
income children of color, and then made arguments about what kind of civic education would 
help empower youth in that context.  A few critics objected to my acceptance of school 
segregation; they wanted me to fight back and work toward school integration.  On their reading, 
my “realism” was a handmaiden to acquiescent complicity.  Other critics, however, were 
concerned that my proposed reforms were way too ambitious given the current political climate; 
they feared I marginalized myself by even advocating for them.  So how do we establish what is 
realistic and what is merely utopian? 
This question takes us back to what role philosophy plays in Jaggar’s theory of change.  
One reason to seek the construction of realistic utopias is that anything less is likely to be too 
mired within the status quo. One reason to seek the construction of realistic utopias is that 
anything more is un-credible: there’s no possible way to get from here to there.  So it is 
important to identify this sweet spot.  But there’s little reason to think that philosophy is the right 
tool for this job.  Policy studies, sociology, psychology, even neurobiology seem more likely to 
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identify the “just right” spot to move society forward.  This is not obviously a task for normative 
philosophy. 
WHAT NATURALIST NON-IDEAL NORMATIVE PHILOSOPHY CAN DO  
Instead, I believe that non-ideal theory can more productively use naturalized 
epistemologies: (1) to identify and explore novel moral concepts; (2) to construct idealized 
normative theories about these moral phenomena made visible by situated inquiry; and (3) to 
propose non-utopian approaches to mitigate injustice.   
In researching Boston Public School’s new school assignment plan, for example, I have 
become fascinated by what I am currently calling the “ethics of pandering.”  This is the ethics of 
reinforcing existing, unjust inequalities on the grounds that doing so has positive knock-on 
effects for everyone, including the least advantaged.  I came to think about this problem because 
middle-class families preemptively flee the Boston Public Schools if they believe their children 
are likely to be assigned to a low-quality school.  Since socioeconomic integration is the most 
reliable way to scale quality in urban schools, it is to everyone’s benefit to draw middle class 
families into the system.  But the only way to keep advantaged families in the system is to give 
them inequitably higher chances to access high quality schools—which is exactly what Boston’s 
new school assignment system does.   
I don’t think that the ethics of pandering is epistemologically distinct from other ethical 
concepts; in fact, one of its virtues is that it is quickly comprehensible even to people who know 
nothing about Boston, education policy, or even philosophy.  Similarly, it could have been first 
developed by an armchair philosopher—although it was perhaps more likely that I would 
stumble on the concept via non-ideal case study research.  Nonetheless, this exercise in non-
ideal, naturalized theory now enables some ideal theorizing, insofar as I’d like to identify general 
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normative parameters for pandering under conditions of antecedent injustice.  How should 
consequentialist considerations about mutual advantage or the difference principle, for example, 
be weighed against deontological considerations about civic respect?  Finally, this exercise in 
grounded reflective equilibrium may help mitigate present-day injustice.  I don’t really care what 
a “realistic utopia” might be for Boston’s school assignment plan, because that’s not the plan in 
existence.  But I do think we might be able to nudge current policies in a slightly more just 
direction by proposing some “leveling up” approaches that increase low-income families’ 
opportunities to access quality schools without obviously threatening middle-class families’ 
privileged access. 
In sum, I do believe that Jaggar has identified important and compelling new approaches 
to engaging in non-ideal philosophical inquiry and normative justification.  I question whether 
her methodology truly rests on new epistemological grounds, and I am especially skeptical that 
the construction of realistic utopias is either a necessary or a desirable aim of naturalized moral 
reasoning.  But I do think her work has a tremendous amount to offer in shifting philosophers out 
of their armchairs, into the field, and ultimately into a form of grounded reflective equilibrium 
that can generate both theoretical innovation and the mitigation of lived injustice.                                                          
1 I should note that in setting out Jaggar’s argument, I am drawing heavily on her two recent 
papers in Metaphilosophy, since her Kneller Lecture is one piece of this larger project. See 
Theresa W. Tobin and Alison M. Jaggar, "Naturalizing Moral Justification: Rethinking the 
Method of Moral Epistemology," Metaphilosophy 44, no. 4 (2013); Alison M. Jaggar and 
Theresa W. Tobin, "Situating Moral Justification: Rethinking the Mission of Moral 
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Epistemology," Metaphilosophy 44, no. 4 (2013).  Since this is a response specifically to the 
Kneller Lecture, however, I confine my critique to the arguments she makes in this lecture.  
2 Tobin and Jaggar, "Naturalizing Moral Justification: Rethinking the Method of Moral 
Epistemology," 414. 
3 I have to admit that I’m not exactly sure what “justification” itself means.  It seems to be a 
combination of “constructing,” “convincing others of” or “proving,” and also possibly “revising 
one’s own” binding moral claims.  I’m curious about whether some or all of this is right; 
Jaggar’s own use of the term seems to shift slightly in different sections of her argument. 
4 I am grateful to Harry Brighouse for pointing out to me that my own normative case study 
research is partly an exercise in reflective equilibrium. 
5 It’s worth noting that I am not addressing myself to Erik Olin Wright’s conception of 
Envisioning Real Utopias (New York: Verso, 2010), since Jaggar’s account of “realistic utopias” 
seems independent of Wright’s conceptual project. 
